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Endogenous spillovers and incentives to innovate
Abstract
We present a new approach to endogenizing technological spillovers. Firms choose levels of a
cost-reducing innovation from a continuum before they engage in competition for each other's
R&D-employees. Successful bids for the competitor's employee then result in higher levels of cost
reduction. Finally, firms enter product market competition. We apply the approach to the long-standing
debate on the effects of the mode of competition on innovation incentives. We show that incentives to
acquire spillovers are stronger and incentives to prevent spillovers are weaker under quantity
competition than under price competition. As a result, for a wide range of parameters, price competition
gives stronger innovation incentives than quantity competition.
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Abstract: 
We present a new approach to endogenizing technological spillovers. Firms choose levels of a 
cost-reducing innovation from a continuum before they engage in competition for each 
other’s R&D-employees. Successful bids for the competitor’s employee then result in higher 
levels of cost reduction. Finally, firms enter product market competition. We apply the 
approach to the long-standing debate on the effects of the mode of competition on innovation 
incentives. We show that incentives to acquire spillovers are stronger and incentives to 
prevent spillovers are weaker under quantity competition than under price competition. As a 
result, for a wide range of parameters, price competition gives stronger innovation incentives 
than quantity competition. 
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Endogenous Spillovers and Incentives to Innovate 
1. Introduction  
In both empirical and theoretical studies of the innovation process, the importance of 
knowledge spillovers has often been emphasized. Some authors have focused on the potential 
adverse consequences for innovation incentives (d’Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988, Kamien 
et al. 1992, Suzumura 1992, Henriques 1990, De Bondt et. al. 1992, Leahy and Neary 1997), 
others have examined the ambiguous effects of spillovers on economic growth (Romer 1986 
and 1990, Aghion and Howitt 1992, Grossman and Helpman 1991). Recently, the effects of 
spillovers on agglomeration patterns have been analyzed (Baldwin et al. 1998). 
This literature has used the convenient simplification that spillover levels are exogenous, that 
is, if one firm achieves a cost reduction, other firms receive a fixed proportion of this cost 
reduction through spillovers, which cannot be influenced by either party. Only recently have 
some authors tried to cope with the fact that the spillover level is endogenous (see 
Katsoulacas and Ulph 1998, Gersbach and Schmutzler 1997, Fosfuri et al. 1998, Roende 
1998, Poyago-Theotoky 1999). Most of these papers, however, deal only with a firm’s 
decision whether or not to allow spillovers to competitors. We start from Gersbach and 
Schmutzler (1997), where firms can not only engage in (costly) activities designed at 
preventing spillovers to competitors, but also in activities designed at obtaining spillovers 
from competitors.  In their setting, technological spillovers depend on the ability of firms to 
attract other firms’ R&D employees and to prevent their own R&D employees from leaving 
the firm. We examine a game in which firms choose the levels of a cost-reducing innovation 
from a continuum before they engage in competition for each other’s R&D-employees in the 
second stage.1 In this stage, firms make wage offers for the own employee and the 
competitors. Whether a firm can obtain spillovers by poaching the competitor’s employee 
depends on the relative attractivity of the contracts offered by the original employer and his 
competitors. Successful bids for the competitor’s employee result in higher levels of cost 
reduction. Finally, firms enter product market competition, given the cost structure 
determined by innovation and spillover levels. Our main contributions are as follows: 
                                                          
1 Gersbach and Schmutzler (1997) only consider 0-1 decisions (”innovate” versus ”do not innovate”). 
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First, we characterize necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibria in which one-way and 
two-way technological spillovers occur for given levels of innovation activity. We show how 
the extent of spillovers depends on the mode of competition.  
Second, we use these results to characterize the subgame perfect equilibria of the innovation 
game. Most importantly, we show that for Cournot competition the only equilibrium for 
sufficiently high innovation costs has both firms investing and bilateral spillovers taking 
place. For Bertrand competition, there is an unilateral equilibrium where one firm invests and 
there are no spillovers. 
Finally, we use these results to show that taking the endogeneity of spillovers into account 
affects familiar results on the incentives for innovation in a systematic way. We illustrate this 
point by taking up the long-standing debate on the effects of the mode of competition on 
innovation incentives. In both IO and growth models, various authors have investigated how 
tough competition (à la Bertrand) and soft competition (à la Cournot) differ in this respect. 
Most of these authors (Brander and Spencer 1983, Delbono and Denicolò 1990, Bester and 
Petrakis 1993) have argued in a world without spillovers. Qiu (1997) has made the important 
point that, with exogenous spillovers, incentives for innovation become weaker in the 
Bertrand case than in the Cournot case.2 In this paper, we show that, with endogenous 
spillovers, this argument becomes weaker and, in many cases, is reversed. The reason is that 
incentives to acquire spillovers are stronger and incentives to prevent spillovers are weaker 
under quantity competition. It turns out that under Bertrand competition, the possibility of 
spillovers does not reduce incentives to produce knowledge. As a result, an innovating firm 
has to worry less about spillovers under price competition than under quantity competition, 
and, consequently, for wide ranges of parameters, price competition gives stronger innovation 
incentives than quantity competition. Our results suggest that weakening product market 
competition in order to spur innovations is hard to justify when spillovers are endogenous.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a three-stage duopoly model. 
Firms first choose innovation levels, then compete for knowledge by making wage offers to 
each other’s R&D employees. Finally, they compete on the product market. In Section 3, we 
give general conditions for the extent of spillovers, assuming given innovation levels. Section 
4 applies these results to the discussion of relative innovation incentives in the Cournot and 
                                                          
2 Another related paper with spillovers is Aghion et al. (1997). 
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Bertrand cases. In section 5 we discuss the robustness of the findings and potential 
extensions. In section 6 we summarize our results and offer extensions.  
2. The Model 
We consider a three-stage game. There are two firms, i = 1 2, .  Initially, firms have constant 
marginal costs c. In period 1, they can carry out an innovation that reduces marginal costs by 
xi . Following Qiu (1997), innovation costs are ( ) 2ii vxxk = , where v > 0 . 
To carry out the innovation, each firm has to hire an R&D employee. In period 2, firms bid 
for each other’s R&D employees: firm i offers wages w j iij , ≠  for firm j’s R&D employee 
and wii  for their own R&D employee. An R&D employee from firm j is assumed to switch 
firms if w wij jj> , otherwise he continues to work for his own firm. To attract the employee 
from firm j, firm i needs to offer a wage which is higher than wjj  by the smallest possible 
currency unit.  
We assume that wage contracts offered to R&D employees can be conditioned on the 
knowledge of both R&D-employees and thus on the relative performance of the R&D 
employees. Thus, on the one hand, the wage offer depends on the knowledge of the R&D-
person himself, on the other hand, it depends on the knowledge of the other firm’s employee. 
While the first element is not problematic, the second element requires that firms can observe 
and verify the knowledge when they make their wage bids or, more plausibly, when 
employees have accepted wage contracts and enter firms. In Gersbach and Schmutzler (1997), 
we discuss in detail how this assumption can be justified. 
If an R&D employee moves to firm i, this firm obtains a further cost reduction x j  thanks to 
knowledge spillovers, so its marginal production costs are c c x xi i j= − − . Hence, we assume 
that the cost reductions are complementary. Also, the knowledge necessary to reduce costs is 
completely transferable to other firms; that is, if spillovers arise, they are perfect: if a firm can 
motivate the R&D person of the other firms to move, this employee will be able to replicate 
the original cost reduction in his new firm.3 
                                                          
3 For a robustness discussion, see section 5. 
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We also assume that knowledge can be duplicated within: If firm i loses an employee to the 
competitor after investing ix , its costs remain at ixc − .4 
If firm i does not obtain the services of employee j, production costs remain at c c xi i= − . In 
period 3, product market competition takes place. We shall suppose the two firms produce 
homogeneous goods. The inverse market demand is given by 
(1) p a q q i j i j ai j= − − = ≠ >; , , ; ;          1 2 0  
Throughout the paper we assume that marginal innovation costs are sufficiently high. 
A1: v a c
c
a c
c
> − −⎧⎨⎩
⎫⎬⎭max ,
2
9 2
.5 
This assumption will later be seen to imply that c x xi j> +  for equilibrium choices of 
investment levels, which is necessary and sufficient for positive marginal costs. We consider 
both price and quantity competition. In either case, a unique equilibrium of the period 3 
subgame exists for each cost vector ( )c ci j,  determined in period 1 and 2. We denote the 
resulting product market profits for firm i as ( )π c c c ci j− −, . We denote by ( )π n i jc c c c− −,  
the net profit of firm i in period 2, defined as ( )π c c c ci j− −,  minus wages paid to the R&D 
persons who will be employed.  
The assumptions of perfect spillovers and homogenous goods simplify the analysis. They are 
also chosen because Qiu (1997) has shown that Cournot competition is more likely to give 
stronger innovation incentives when goods are close substitutes and exogenous spillovers are 
high. With our assumptions we can make the point that, even in a setting that satisfies these 
characteristics in the best possible way, the opposite result arises for endogenous spillovers. 
3. The Spillover Game 
We now consider the spillover game, that is, the subgame starting with first-period investment 
levels x xi j, . We say that the resulting spillovers are bilateral if each firm acquires the 
services of the other firm’s employee, unilateral if only one firm acquires the services of the 
other firm’s employee. We characterize the conditions under which bilateral spillovers or no 
                                                          
4 Clearly, an investing firm has an incentive to secure that the knowledge of R&D projects is codified and distributed within 
the firm, so that it does not depend on the future services of the knowledge-bearing employee. 
5 A discussion of the case of v violating A1 will also be the subject of section 5. 
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spillovers occur. Here and in the following, we assume that the firms do not play weakly 
dominated strategies. 
To simplify the exposition, we shall always neglect the smallest currency unit. Hence, if two 
wages are identical in equilibrium, it is understood that the firm that wins the wage bid offers 
the equilibrium wage plus the smallest currency unit. 
Proposition 1:  
(a) For an equilibrium with bilateral spillovers, the following condition is necessary: 
(a1)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) jijixxxxxxxxxxxxxx jijiijijiijiji ≠=++−+≥+−++ ;2,1,;,,,, ππππ  
(a1) and (a2) below are sufficient for at least one equilibrium with bilateral spillovers to 
exist. 
(a2) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )π π π πx x x x x x x x x x x x i j i ji j i j i j j i j i j i+ + + + ≥ + + = ≠, , , , ; , , ;1 2  
If (a1) and (a2) hold, there is a Pareto-dominant equilibrium among these bilateral 
spillover equilibria, with wages ( ) ( )w w x x x x x x xji ii i j j i j i j= = + − + +π π, ,  and net 
profits ( ) ( )ijijijin xxxxxxx ,,2 +−++= πππ  for i j j i, , ;= ≠1 2 . 
(b) An equilibrium with unilateral spillovers from firm 2 to firm 1 exists if and only if the 
following conditions hold 
(b1)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )212121211221 ,,,, xxxxxxxxxxxx +−+≥+−+ ππππ  
(b2)  ( ) ( ) ( )2122121221 ,,2, xxxxxxxxxx +−++≥+ πππ  
(b3)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2121221221 ,,,, xxxxxxxxxx +−≥−+ ππππ  
(b4)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ),(,2,,, 122122121211221 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx πππππ ++−++≥+−+     
(b5)  ( ) ( ) ( )212121221 ,,,2 xxxxxxxxx πππ −++−+ ( ) ( )212121 ,, xxxxxx +−+≥ ππ  
Usually, there are multiple equilibrium wages. 
(c) A necessary condition for an equilibrium without spillovers is  
(c1) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ijijijiiji xxxxxxxxxx ,,,, ππππ −+≥+− ,    jiji ≠= ;2,1, . 
The proof is given in the appendix. Essentially, the proof tests whether firms can increase 
profits by moving to another spillover regime. Consider for instance the case of bilateral 
spillovers, as in (a). The left-hand side of (a1) is the loss in product market profits that firm i 
would obtain if it did not poach the competitor’s employee, thus ending up without a worker. 
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The right-hand side describes firm j’s willingness to pay for its own employee, starting from 
bilateral spillovers. The condition thus makes sure that, starting from a situation where each 
firm has poached the competitor’s employee, the willingness to pay for keeping the 
competitor’s employee is higher than the willingness to pay for regaining the services of 
one’s own employee. 
Proposition 1 indicates that even within a spillover regime equilibria are usually not unique in 
terms of wages because of a standard coordination problem. Consider case (a) again. In the 
proposed equilibrium, each firm pays the minimum wage that is necessary to pay for the 
competitor’s employee, assuming that the competitor does not pay more than the value of the 
worker.  In principle, each firm i would be willing to pay as much as the left hand side of (a1). 
Any combination of wages between the left-hand side and the right-hand side of (a1) that are 
identical for both firms could also constitute a Nash-equilibrium. Even though firms offer 
higher wages than their willingness to pay to prevent their employee from leaving to the 
competitor, they do not actually have to pay, as the competitor obtains his services. However, 
as wages are unnecessarily high from the firms’ point of view, the equilibrium is Pareto-
inefficient. 
In the following, we concentrate on the Pareto-dominant equilibria. The Pareto selection 
criterion is equivalent to the criterion that no firm ends up paying higher wages for employees 
than its own differential profit from keeping or hiring the employee. Uniqueness of equilibria 
in the remainder of the paper refers to the set of equilibria that are neither Pareto-dominated 
nor involve playing weakly dominated strategies. It will turn out below that the proposed 
selection criterion biases the outcome in favor of the Cournot case, but that nevertheless 
investment incentives are stronger under Bertrand than under Cournot. 
In the next section we will apply proposition 1 to price and quantity competition. We will 
show that, for Cournot competition, only bilateral spillovers occur if innovations are not too 
large. Under Bertrand competition, only unilateral spillovers can occur. We shall use this 
result to derive the subgame perfect equilibrium of the innovation game which provides a 
comparison of innovation incentives under Bertrand and Cournot competition when 
technological spillovers are endogenized. 
4. The Nature of Competition and Innovation Incentives 
The effects of the mode of competition on innovation incentives have been the subject of a 
long-standing debate. In both IO and growth models, various authors have investigated how 
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tough competition (à la Bertrand) and soft competition (à la Cournot) differ in this respect. 
Most of these papers ignore spillovers.6 Qiu (1997) considered exogenous spillovers.7 We 
complement this discussion by showing how endogenizing technological spillovers along the 
lines of section 3 changes the results. We will show that, with endogenous spillovers, 
Bertrand competition yields higher innovation incentives than Cournot competition for 
sufficiently high innovation costs, which differs from the case of exogenous spillovers.  
4.1. Spillovers in the Cournot Case 
We first apply proposition 1 to the Cournot case. Straightforward applications of the standard 
result that ( ) ( ) 92, 2jiji ccacc +−=π  can be used to characterize the second-period 
equilibria. Here and in the following, we shall use the notation ca −≡α . We first treat the 
cases of no spillovers and bilateral spillovers, respectively. 
Corollary 1:  A subgame equilibrium without spillovers cannot exist if 01 >x  and 02 >x . 
Corollary 2: In the Cournot case, the following statements hold: 
(a) An equilibrium with bilateral spillovers exists if and only if  232 ji xx −≥α  
( )jiji ≠=    ;2,1, . 
(b) If ji xx 232 −>α , spillovers are bilateral for every pure strategy equilibrium. 
(c) In a bilateral spillover equilibrium, net profits are 
( ) ( )
.
9
22
9
2
9
2 22222 jiijjin xxxxxxx i −++=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ++−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ++= ααααπ  
The proofs are given in the appendix. 
We now use our results to delineate parameter regions for which there is a subgame perfect 
equilibrium of the full game with bilateral spillovers. For the purpose of the next result, we 
strengthen assumption A1 for the Cournot case. 
A2: v  is so large that it is never profitable to deviate to cx =1  or to 191 −−= vcx
α  from an 
investment level of  
191 −= vx
α  if the competitor has chosen the same investment level. 
                                                          
6 See Brander and Spencer 1983, Delbono and Denicolò 1990, Bester and Petrakis 1993, Aghion et al. 1997. 
7 See also the discussions in Bonnano and Haworth 1998 and Gerowski 1995. 
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The assumption, which can be stated in terms of the exogenous parameters vca ,,  as well,8 
makes sure that we can disregard deviations that result in zero production costs. 
Proposition 2: 
Suppose A2 holds and 9/4>v . Then, there is a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure 
strategies with bilateral spillovers in the Cournot case. This equilibrium is unique within the 
bilateral spillover regime9. In this equilibrium,  
(3) γα ≡−== 1921 vxx
cc . Equilibrium payoffs are  
9
92 222 γαγγα v−+−  
Proof: see appendix. 
For values of v  below 4/9 the analysis becomes more complex. The proof shows that the 
parameter restriction guarantees that there are only two types of feasible deviations from the 
equilibrium. First, investments may be increased, resulting in unilateral inward spillovers. 
Second, investments might be reduced to 0, with no spillovers. For 9/4<v , the method used 
in the proof to show that upward deviations are not profitable would have to be modified. For 
,18/5<v  the proof shows that additional downward deviations to investment levels resulting 
in asymmetric spillovers might arise. In the proof, it also turns out that the bilateral spillover 
regime definitely does not extend below 9/2=v : for lower values, deviations to zero 
investment, with no spillovers in the second stage, will be profitable.  
The focus on sufficient conditions in the proof of proposition 2 suggests that the same pure 
strategy equilibrium might exist for slightly lower values than v=4/9 if the other assumptions 
hold as well. But as we shall discuss in section 5, mixed strategy equilibria will prevail for 
lower values. Finally, the analysis in section 5 will show that, for very low values of v 
(contradicting A1), equilibria will result where both firms choose the highest possible 
investment level c. 
4.2. Spillovers under Bertrand Competition 
We now consider the case of price competition. In this case, firm i will obtain product market 
profits of 
                                                          
8 For instance, a sufficient condition is  0
3
2
9
2
9
4465481 2222223 >−−+++−− acacvavacvcacvcv . 
9  Uniqueness in general can be established for 2
9
1
3
1 +>v . 
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(4) ( ) ( )( ){ }0,max, jijji ccccccc −−=−− απ  
provided that jc  is not greater than firm i’s monopoly price. For linear demand, this condition 
amounts to 
(5) ( )ji cccc −+≤− 2α . 
Proposition 3: 
Suppose firms are labeled so that x x1 2≥ . Also suppose (5) holds for i=1, j=2 and 
jjii ccxccx −=−= , . In the Bertrand case, there exists an equilibrium involving unilateral 
spillovers. For this equilibrium, the following conditions hold: 
(6) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )π π π πx x x x x x w w x x x x x x1 2 2 1 1 2 11 12 1 2 1 2 1 2+ − + ≥ + = + − +, , , ,  and 
(7) ( ) ( )w x x x x x12 1 2 2 1 2≤ + −π π, ,  
Net profits are  
(8) ( ) ( )π πx x x x x x1 2 2 1 2 1 0+ − + ≥, ,  for firm 1, 0 for firm 2.10  
If x x1 2> , the spillovers flow from firm 2 to firm 1; if x x1 2= , the direction is indeterminate. 
Finally, any pure strategy equilibrium involves unilateral spillovers and satisfies (6)-(8), if no 
weakly dominated strategies are played. 
Proof: see appendix.  
Using this result, we can immediately analyze the equilibrium structure of the full game, 
provided marginal innovation costs are not too low. 
 
 
Proposition 4: 
Suppose A1 holds and v ≥ +1 4 3 8/ / . Then, except for relabeling of firms, there exists 
exactly one equilibrium in the Bertrand case. In this equilibrium, 
.0;
2 21
== BB x
v
x α  
                                                          
10 In particular, if x x1 2= , both firms earn zero profits. 
12 
Proof: see appendix. Again, a brief discussion of smaller parameter values will be the subject 
of section 5. 
4.3. Comparison of Innovation Incentives 
Putting together propositions 2 and 4, it immediately follows that innovation incentives are 
stronger for price competition than for quantity competition, provided innovation costs are 
sufficiently high. 
Proposition 5: 
Suppose 834/1 +≥v  and that A1 and A2 hold. Then, for suitable choice of firm indexes, 
.022
19
2
2 2211
=>==−>=
BccB xxx
vv
x αα  
Thus, total investment is higher for Bertrand competition than for Cournot competition. 
This result is the main conclusion of our analysis. The relationship between total innovation 
incentives under Bertrand and Cournot for different values of v  are illustrated in figure 1 for 
10=α .  
Intuitively, for Bertrand competition, having the same costs as the competitor is not preferable 
to having higher costs, whereas having lower costs is preferable to having identical costs. 
Therefore, when only one firm has innovated incentives to acquire spillovers are low relative 
to the incentives to prevent them, and the fear of spillovers does not reduce innovation 
incentives. As this logic does not apply to Cournot competition, ignoring the endogeneity of 
spillovers overstates the innovation incentives in the Cournot case relative to the Bertrand 
case. With endogenous spillovers, therefore, innovation incentives may be stronger for 
Bertrand competition, even when, for exogenous spillovers, the opposite would be true. 
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Figure1: Relationship between innovation incentives under Bertrand and Cournot competition 
Note that this result does not depend on our use of Pareto-dominance as selection criterion. 
Pareto dominated equilibria, that do not rely on weakly dominated strategies, only exist in the 
Cournot case. If firms coordinate on such an equilibrium in the second stage, this reduces 
investment incentives even further, thus strengthening the result that innovation incentives are 
higher for Bertrand than for Cournot competition.  
Finally, in the parameter regime described by proposition 5, investment incentives are always 
higher for Bertrand competition than for Cournot competition, independent of the market size 
parameter α . Nevertheless, increasing α  has an effect on the difference between investment 
incentives. An immediate corollary of proposition 5 is that increasing market size strengthens 
investment more in the Bertrand case than in the Cournot case. 
Corollary 3: Suppose 834/1 +≥v  and that A1 and A2 hold. Then,  
 ( ) ( )
αα ∂
+∂>∂
+∂ ccBB xxxx 2121 . 
 
5. Robustness 
We have shown that for 8341 +>v , R&D expenditures are higher under Bertrand 
competition than under Cournot competition. We will explore in this section what happens for 
lower values of v. We also explain intuitively how this parameter enters our arguments. 
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The lower bound on v  matters for two reasons. First, assumption A1 ensures that marginal 
production costs cannot become negative under Cournot competition v a c
c
> −⎛⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
2
9
 and under 
Bertrand competition ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ >
c
v
2
α . These two assumptions are combined in A1. For sufficiently 
small a , and c  sufficiently close to a , both conditions, however, can be fulfilled by smaller 
numerical values than 8341 +=v . Second, the equilibria which are used for our 
comparisons may not exist for lower values of v.  
5.1 Very Low Innovation Costs 
We first consider what happens for very small values of v, where A1 is violated. Instead, we 
impose the constraint x x ci j, ≤  directly. Then, it is intuitive that there is an equilibrium under 
Cournot competition where both firms choose the maximal investment level cxi = . The 
resulting profits are ( ) 222 9/, vcavccc −=−π . Any unilateral reduction of investments would 
reduce product market profits from 9/2a  by an amount that is independent of v. To 
compensate for this profit reduction, one might attempt to obtain spillovers from the 
competitor, but again this would lead to positive wage costs that are independent of v. The 
innovation cost reductions from choosing ix  below c, however, go to zero as v does. 
Therefore, both firms choose cxi =  under Cournot competition for very small values of v. 
Under Bertrand competition, for 0→v , there is a unilateral spillover equilibrium where one 
firm will innovate, say firm 1, with x c1 =  and the other firm neither innovates nor obtains 
spillovers. Therefore, for sufficiently small values of marginal R&D costs, aggregate 
innovation incentives under Cournot can be higher, but the firm that is active under Bertrand 
competition produces at the same marginal costs as firms under Cournot competition.  
5.2 Intermediate Innovation Costs 
For intermediate values of the marginal cost of R&D production, the arguments become more 
difficult. So far, we have characterized the equilibrium behavior for Cournot for 9/4>v , 
whereas for Bertrand we only treated 8341 +>v . We now extend the Bertrand analysis to 
the parameter region 83
4
1
2
1 +<≤ v  to allow for a more complete comparison with the 
Cournot case. For Bertrand competition we obtain: 
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Proposition 6: Suppose that A1 holds and that 83
4
1
2
1 +<≤ v . Then, no subgame perfect 
equilibrium in pure strategies exists. 
The proof is given in the appendix. Clearly, there exist equilibria in mixed strategies for 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +∈
8
3
4
1,
2
1v  under Bertrand. In any symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, for each firm 
there is a positive probability that it will not innovate, because choosing low but positive 
levels of cost reduction can never be profitable if the other follows symmetric strategies. 
Therefore, in the range 83
4
1
2
1 +>≥ v   there exists a positive probability such that no 
innovation takes place under Bertrand competition. Thus, our clear cut result (proposition 5) 
does not carry over automatically to lower values of v.11 Also, for 
9
4≤v , we cannot exclude 
mixed strategy equilibria under Cournot competition as long as the equilibrium in which both 
firms choose the maximal investment level cxi =  does not exist. Thus the analysis of 
innovation incentives below 
9
4=v  will require a comparison of mixed strategy equilibria 
under Bertrand and Cournot.12 
6. Extensions and Conclusion 
In this paper, we introduced a framework for the analysis of innovation incentives with 
endogenous spillovers. We showed that, compared to the case of exogenous spillovers, 
innovation incentives are strengthened in the Bertrand case relative to the Cournot case, 
implying that for sufficiently high innovation costs, these incentives are stronger for Bertrand. 
The results have been derived under the simplifying assumption of homogeneous goods and 
perfect spillovers. With suitable modifications, our central result still holds with these 
assumptions relaxed. For instance, as long as product differentiation is not too strong, 
incentives to obtain spillovers are still fairly low under price competition, and by similar 
reasoning as above, innovation incentives are hardly affected by the prospect of spillovers 
when competition is in prices; accordingly, familiar results on the relation between innovation 
incentives in the Bertrand and Cournot case may be reversed. 
                                                          
11 One can even give examples when expected investment under Bertrand is lower than under Cournot. 
12 The analysis becomes extremely tedious and no comprehensive comparison is available yet.  
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Our model could be extended in various directions. First, the analysis would be much more 
complicated in the case that there are n > 1 R&D employees in each firm. This would 
introduce competing effects. On the one hand, it may be hard for firms to avoid spillovers if 
the knowledge of one employee can substitute the knowledge of others - competitors may 
only have to attract a small number of employees out of a large group to obtain spillovers. On 
the other hand, no employee can easily appropriate the information rent because of the 
competition from other employees. The net effect compared with the present situation is 
unclear. Compared with the exogenous case, however, it remains true that appropriability is 
easier to satisfy with endogenous spillovers. Also, because the incentives for firms to acquire 
spillovers are particular small in the Bertrand case, we conjecture that it is still true that in this 
case the endogeneity of spillovers strengthens incentives for innovation relative to the 
Cournot case. The proof of this general conjecture will be left for future research. 
Second, we worked with the joint assumptions that R&D knowledge can be duplicated 
internally and is transferable. Thus, once an R&D-employee has implemented a cost 
reduction, costs remain low, even if the knowledge-bearing employee changes the firm, and a 
firm that successfully lures away R&D-employees from the competitor is assumed to obtain 
the same cost reduction as the competitor, i.e., knowledge travels with the employee. The 
duplicability assumption is more palatable for managers than for workers. If a trained worker 
leaves a firm, the fruits of human capital investments are usually gone without traces.13 
Incentives for firms to invest in general human capital of workers rather than managers are 
significantly different compared to the R&D situation examined in the paper.  
To understand the effects of assuming that an employee’s knowledge is worth less once he is 
gone, consider Bertrand competition. A firm that has trained a worker not only loses the 
services of an employee who is poached by a competitor, but in addition the competitor is 
strengthened. This makes labor turnover particularly undesirable and forces firms to increase 
the wages to trained workers in order to deter them from leaving, thereby reducing training 
incentives in the first place, since a firm that has invested in training has no advantage over a 
firm that has not invested in bidding for trained workers. Workers might obtain all rents from 
training in this constellation, thus making the training investment sunk costs for firms. As a 
consequence, there can be an equilibrium where no training investments take place under 
Bertrand competition, since these investments can never be recovered. The same can happen 
under Cournot competition, because again a firm that has invested in training has no 
                                                          
13 Most likely, a realistic model lies in between the two polar cases discussed in this section. 
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advantage over a firm that has not when trained workers decide at which firm they want to be 
employed. However, under Cournot competition another equilibrium can exist, in which both 
firms invest in worker training. The intuition why firms are willing to invest is as follows: 
Starting from a situation where both firms have invested, neither would gain much by 
poaching the competitor’s worker, since both firms already have sufficiently high levels of 
human capital in house.14 Therefore, to keep workers, firms need to offer wages that are 
smaller than in the case where only one firm invests in training. As a consequence, the fear of 
increasing future wage costs by not investing in training can motivate firms to invest in 
human capital if the other firm invests as well.  
To sum up, instead of considering the polar case where knowledge can be duplicated within 
the firm and is fully transferable to the other firm, one might move to the other polar case 
where knowledge is transferable to other firms if the employee leaves, but cannot be 
duplicated within the firm because it is embodied in human capital. This opens up a host of 
new interesting issues for future research with the possibility of multiple equilibria. Our 
discussion in this section suggests the results on the comparison between Bertrand and 
Cournot with respect to investment incentives could be reversed. 
                                                          
14 An example is available upon request. These considerations require that trained workers are to some extent substitutes or 
there are sufficiently decreasing marginal returns to human capital. 
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Appendix:  
Proof of Proposition 1: 
Note that in any equilibrium w wij jj=  for i j i j, , ; := ≠1 2 , for otherwise,  the firm obtaining 
the bid could decrease its wage offer and still obtain spillovers. 
(a) An equilibrium with bilateral spillovers requires that it is not possible to increase 
profits by modifying wages such that: 
(i) The firm ends up with no employee. 
(ii) There are no spillovers. 
(iii) The firm ends up with both employees. 
Thus, as firm i earns net equilibrium profits ( ) ijjiji wxxxx −++ ,π , a wage profile is an 
equilibrium with bilateral spillovers if and only if for .,2,1, jiji ≠=  
( ) ( )jiiijjiji xxxwxxxx +≥−++ ,, ππ  
( ) ( ) iijiijjiji wxxwxxxx −≥−++ ,, ππ  
( ) ( ) ijiijjiijjiji wwxxxwxxxx −−+≥−++ ,, ππ  
As jiiijjij wwww == , , this is equivalent with 
(i) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )jijjijiiijijijji xxxxxxxwxxxxxxx +−++≤≤++−+ ,,,, ππππ  
(ii) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )jiijijiijjijiiji xxxxxxxwxxxxxxx +−++≤≤++−+ ,,,, ππππ  
(iii) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )jijijiiiijjijiij xxxxxxwwxxxxxx ,,,, ππππ −++≤−≤++−  
(i) and (ii) clearly require (a1). 
Also, if (a1) and (a2) hold, (iii) is satisfied as well for the wages under consideration. 
Clearly, this equilibrium is Pareto-dominant among the bilateral spillover equilibria, as 
wages cannot be reduced without leaving the regime. 
(a)  Condition (b1) can be seen to be necessary as follows. In the unilateral spillover 
equilibrium, firm 1 gets net profits ( ) 1211221 , wwxxx −−+π . By lowering its wages 
sufficiently, it would lose both employees and obtain net payoffs  ( )211 , xxx +π . This is 
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not a profitable deviation if ( ) ( )2111211221 ,, xxxwwxxx +≥−−+ ππ . Similarly, the 
competitor does not want to attract both employees if  
( ) ( )2121211121 ,, xxxwwxxx +≤−−+ ππ .  
Therefore  
(iv) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2121211211211221 ,,,, xxxxxxwwxxxxxx +−+≥+≥+−+ ππππ   
is necessary for an equilibrium with unilateral spillovers, and hence (b1) is. Similarly, we 
require 
(v) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2122121112121221 ,,,, xxxxxxxwxxxxxxx +−++≥≥++−+ ππππ  
(vi) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )212121221221 ,,,, xxxxxwxxxxx +−≥≥−+ ππππ  
and hence (b2) and (b3). 
For (v), (vi) to be compatible with (iv), we require that the lowest (highest) values of 11w  
and 12w  satisfying (v) and (vi) also satisfy the left (right) hand side of (iv). 
This requirement yields conditions (b4) and (b5). Hence, (b1) – (b5) are necessary for an 
equilibrium. They are also sufficient, for they imply that (iv) to (vi) can be satisfied 
simultaneously. Obviously, if (b1)-(b5) hold with inequality, there are multiple equilibria. 
(c)  A wage profile is an equilibrium without spillovers if and only if for jiji ≠= ,2,1,  
( ) ( )jiiiiji xxxwxx +≥− ,, ππ  
( ) ( ) ijjijiiiji wxxxxwxx −++≥− ,, ππ  
( ) ( ) iiijjjiiiji wwxxxwxx −−+≥− ,, ππ  
Equivalently, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ijijiiijiiji xxxxxwxxxxx ,,,, ππππ −+≥≥+−  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )jijjiijjijij xxxxxwxxxxx ,,,, ππππ −+≥≥+−  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ijjijiijiijijiji xxxxxxwwxxxxxx ,,,, ππππ −++≥−≥++−  
The first two conditions require (c1).  
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 Proof of Corollary 1: 
Apply Proposition 1c. This gives 
( ) ( ) ≥+−+−+ 22 22 jiji xxxx αα ( ) ( )22 2 ijji xxxx +++−+ αα  
For 0>ix , simple derivations show this is equivalent with ji xx 632 −≤α . This condition 
cannot hold for iji ≠= 2,1  at the same time, because 063 >− ji xx  implies 063 <− ij xx . 
 
Proof of Corollary 2:  
(a)  232 ji xx −≥α  is condition (a1) of proposition 1. It also implies condition (a2) of 
proposition 1, because in the Cournot case with linear demand, this condition becomes 
.;2,1,for  632 ijjixx ji ≠=−≥α  Hence, part (a) follows. By corollary 1, an equilibrium 
without spillovers does not exist. By comparison of conditions (a1) and (b2) in proposition 
(1) there can be no equilibrium with unilateral spillovers when an equilibrium with bilateral 
spillovers exists, completing part (b) of the corollary. Part (c) follows directly from part (a) of 
proposition 1. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
First note that, by corollary 2(a) and 2(b), for the proposed values of x xc c1 2 and  , and v > 1 6/  
the resulting subgame, there is a unique Pareto-dominant pure strategy equilibrium with 
bilateral spillovers. By corollary 2(c), therefore, a Nash equilibrium with bilateral spillovers 
requires 
arg=cix ( ) ( ) ,9292max 2
22
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧ −++−++ iijjix vxxxxxi
αα
 which implies 
1921 −== vxx
cc α . 
Note that assumption A2 implies v a c c> −( ) /2 9  and hence x x cc c1 2+ < , so that marginal 
production costs are positive. 
To test for subgame perfection, we need to check that it is not worthwhile for firm i to change 
its investment level so much that firms are not in the bilateral spillover regime in period 2.  
First note that, by corollary 1, an equilibrium without spillovers does not exist if both 
investment levels are positive. If firm i deviates to 0=ix and there are no spillovers, the 
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resulting profit is ( ) 92γα − , so that the net deviation profit becomes 2
9
2
9
4 γγαγ v++− . 
This expression is negative  if 9/2>v  . For spillovers to flow from i to j, condition (b2) of  
proposition 1  would have to hold with i and j replaced and γ=ix  and some positive ix . 
However, simple but tedious derivations show that condition (b2)  would yield 
0
19
518
2
1 <−
−<
v
vxi α .  
There is a subgame equilibrium with unilateral spillovers from j to i if and only if 
)19(6 −≥ vvxi α . This can be seen because, in the Cournot case with ( )19 −= vx j α  the 
conditions in proposition 1 (b) are 
(i)  
19
518
3
1
−
−≥
v
vxi α  
(ii) ( )19/6 −≥ vvxi α  
(iii) 
19
518
10
1
−
−−≥
v
vxi α  
(iv) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−++⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−≤⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−+ 19431921932
2
2
v
xx
vv
x iii
ααααα  
(v) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−++⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−≤⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−+ 19431921932
2
2
v
xx
vv
x iii
ααααα  
 
In the parameter regime under consideration, (i) is implied by (ii), and (iii) always holds. 
Condition (iv) and (v), which are equivalent in our case, hold for 9/4>v  and 
( )196 −> vvxi α . Thus all five conditions hold for 9/4>v  as long as (ii) does. 
 
If ( )19/6 −≥ vvxi α  and one of the asymmetric spillover equilibria results, the proof of 
proposition 1b gives a lower bound of ( ) ( )jijiji xxxxxx +−+ ,, ππ  for the wage payments, 
and a corresponding upper bound for the deviation profit of 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) =−+−+−+ 2,,, ijijijijji vxxxxxxxxxx πππ  
2
222
199
2
199
2
9
4
9 i
ii vx
vv
xx −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−−+
ααα . 
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The derivative of this expression with respect to ix   is ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
++−−
19
44581
9
2 2
v
xvxvx iii α . The 
derivative can be shown to be negative for positive ix . Hence, the profit is decreasing in ix  in 
the parameter regime under consideration. Thus, if there is a profitable deviation, it must be to 
the regime boundary, ( )19/6 −= vvxi α . Inserting this value for ix  gives 
( )
( )2
232
199
130225324
−
++−−
v
vvvα . Subtracting the equilibrium profit gives a net deviation profit 
of  ( )( )2
232
199
210127315
−
++−−
v
vvvα .  This turns out to be negative for all positive values of v .  
 
We now turn to uniqueness. Since marginal investment costs are zero at xi = 0 and the 
marginal profit increase from investment is positive, no firm will choose xi = 0  in any 
equilibrium under Cournot competition. Therefore, applying corollary 1, no equilibrium 
without spillovers can exist. We are left with two constellations. We check whether there may 
be further equilibrium constellations ji xx ≤<0  with bilateral spillovers.  
In the bilateral spillover regime corollary 2c.) shows that profits of firm i are given by: 
2
222
9
22
i
jii x
xxx ναα −−++  
Since there are no interaction terms between xi  and x j , the optimal choice of firm i must 
fulfill ( )19 −= vxi α , no matter what jx  is. The same argument applies for firm j. Therefore, 
an equilibrium with bilateral spillovers different from the one in the proposition cannot exist.  
 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
The proposed equilibrium exists by (i) - (vi) below. 
(i) Because ( ) ( ) ( )w w x x x x x x x x x11 12 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1+ = + − + = +π π π, , ,  firm 2 does not want to 
attract both employees: this would leave net payoff unaffected. 
(ii) For firm 2, attracting only the other firm’s employee would lead to payoffs 
( )π x x x x w1 2 1 2 21 0+ + − ≤, . 
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(iii) Avoiding spillovers would lead to net payoffs ( )π x x w2 1 22, −  for firm 2. As x x2 1≤ , this 
expression is also non-positive. 
(iv) Firm 1 makes no deviation where both firms obtain spillovers and both firms end up with 
equal costs, as it would lose its profit. 
(v) Similarly, firm 1 does not let firm 2 have both employees, because of  
( ) ( ) ( )π π πx x x x x x x x x w w1 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 11 12+ = + − + ≥ +, , , . 
(vi) Firm 1 does not refrain from hiring the other firm’s employee because, by (7),  
( ) ( )π πx x x x x w1 2 1 2 2 12, ,≤ + − . 
Also there is no equilibrium with unilateral spillovers that does not satisfy (6) and (7). By (i), 
(v) and (vi), the inequalities on wages given in (6) and (7) are necessary. In addition, the 
equality  
( ) ( )w w w w x x x x x x11 12 12 22 1 2 1 2 1 2+ = + = + − +π π, ,  holds, 
for otherwise firm 2 would be offering more for the two employees than they are worth, that 
is, it would play a weakly dominated strategy. There is no equilibrium with bilateral 
spillovers, as this would lead to zero profits for both firms, and no firm would be willing to 
pay a positive amount to obtain the competitor’s employee. There is no equilibrium without 
spillovers: Such an equilibrium would require w wii ji= . Supposing that x x2 1< ,  firm 2 
would only pay w22 0= .  Increasing w12  slightly above zero would increase profits for firm 1. 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 4: 
(i) First note that assumption A1 implies cv <2/α , so that x cB1 < .  
(ii) There is no equilibrium with x x1 2 0= > : both firms would obtain zero profits in the 
product market; hence they would be better off not investing at all. 
(iii) There is no equilibrium with x x1 2 0= = . Both firms obtain zero net profits in the 
product market; using proposition 3, a small cost reduction x1  would yield total payoffs 
2
11 xvx −α . For small x1 , this is positive. 
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(iv) There is no equilibrium with x x1 2 0> > : firm 2 obtains zero profits in the product 
market, and hence, subtracting investment costs, negative total payoffs, so it would be 
better off setting x2 0= . 
(v) The proposed values of xi  are equilibrium choices. We first note that x
B
1  maximizes 
2
11 xvx −α . Moreover, x B1  is too low for firm 1 to obtain the monopoly profit, since 
condition (5) α≤Bx1  is satisfied for v ≥ 12 . Therefore, ( ) 11 0, xx απ =  and x B1  maximizes 
( )π x v x1 120, − . 
Next, we need to check that firm 1 has no incentive to select x1  so high to obtain 
monopoly profits. Profits in the monopoly case when x a c1 > −  would amount to 
( ) 2
1
2
1
4
vxx −+α . Maximizing with respect to x1  yields 141 −= vx
α  which is a 
contradiction to 
2
1 for 1 ≥> vx α . Hence, firm 1 does not want to become a monopolist. 
Finally, we have to show that firm 2 cannot set x2  so high that it obtains a positive 
profit. We have to distinguish two cases. First, we assume that firm 2 does not become a 
monopolist by leapfrogging x B1 . According to proposition 3 firm 2 will obtain 
spillovers from firm 1, and its total payoff is given by: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 22211222221121 ,, vxxxxxvxxxxxxx BBBBB −+−+=−+−+ ααππ . The optimal value of 
x2  obtainable in this way is given by 
Bx
v
x 12 2
== α . Since 
( ) ( )π πx x x x x xB B B1 2 1 1 2 2 0+ − + =, ,  for x x B2 1=  firm 2 would have negative total payoff 
equal to −vx22 . Thus, firm 2 has no incentive to innovate itself. 
Second, we show that firm 2 does not want to set x2  so high that it will sell at the 
monopoly price. By (5), it would set the monopoly price if 
212
12 x
v
vxx B =⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +=+≥ αα . After choosing x2  so high, it would obtain 
( ) ( )π πx x x x x xB B B1 2 1 1 2 2+ − +, , . ( )π x x xB B1 2 1+ ,  is the monopoly profit corresponding 
to costs of c x xB− −1 2 ,  i.e. ( )4
2
21 xx
B ++α .  ( )π x x xB1 2 2+ ,  is equal to ( )21 xxB +⋅ α . 
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Hence, the optimal deviation profit involving monopoly pricing is 
( ) ( )
4
4
4
4
4
max
2
221
2
21
22
xvxxxx BB
xx −+−++≥ αα . An interior solution requires 
( ) 0842 2121 =−−++ xvxxx BBα . The second-order-condition is fulfilled for v > 14 .  
We obtain 
v
xx
B
41
1
2 −
−= α . 
Finally, we show that if this expression is larger than x2, we obtain a contradiction and 
hence firm 2 does not set the monopoly price. To this end, note that  
( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−=−
−
=−
−
vv
v
v
v
v
xB
241
21
41
2
41
1 α
ααα
. Hence, 212 41
x
v
xx
B
>−
−= α  implies 
( ) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +>−
−
v
v
vv
v 1
241
21 αα   or ( ) ( )
1 2
1 4
2 1−− > +
v
v
v .  For v > 1
4
, this is equivalent to  
v v2
1
2
1
8
0+ − < and hence v < +1
4
3
8
, which is a contradiction to our assumption.  
 
 
Proof of proposition 6: 
Using the same reasoning as in (ii) - (iv) in the proof of proposition 4, x B2  must be zero in 
equilibrium. Given x B2 0=  and using part (v) of the proof of proposition 4, the optimal 
response of firm 1 is to set 
v
xB
21
α=  because v > 1
2
 ensures that firm 1 does not want to 
become a monopolist. But if 
v
xB
21
α=  and v < +1
4
3
8
, the proof of proposition 4 shows that 
firm 2 has an incentive to leapfrog firm 1 by investing ( )( ) vv
vx
241
21
2 −
−= α  and acting as a 
monopolist. Firm 2 sets the monopoly price if 212
12 x
v
vxx B =⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +=+≥ αα  which is fulfilled 
if 83
4
1 +<v . Therefore, x B2 0=  cannot be an equilibrium choice and no subgame perfect 
equilibrium in pure strategies exists.  
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